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BREXIT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Christopher McCorkindale* 
Rights protection in the UK is multi-faceted and multi-layered. Multi-faceted because our rights 
derive from several sources: from the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR or the 
Convention); from the general principles of EU law or from its Charter of Fundamental Rights (the EU 
Charter), as well as from the common law. These sources overlap in various ways: the rights 
protected by the EU Charter draw heavily from the Convention rights, and the latter, arguably, 
reflect protections already found in the common law.1 However, there are also significant points of 
divergence: what registers as a common law right depends upon the cases that come before the 
courts (so, common law rights are well developed in relation to access to justice and procedural 
fairness, but less so in other areas), whilst the Charter is simultaneously less expansive than the 
Convention in its scope (being applicable only to action taken in the sphere of EU law), yet more 
expansive than the Convention in its coverage (with greater protections for certain social, economic 
and equality rights as well as for so ĐĂůůĞĚ  “ƚŚŝƌĚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ƚŚŽƐĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽĚĂƚĂ
protection, bio-ethics and good administration). Multi-layered because the level and scope of rights 
protection varies significantly according to the distribution of power ĂĐƌŽƐƐ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂů
constitution. Action taken at the level of the EU might engage and be limited by the general 
principles or by Charter rights; UK-level action might engage and be limited by the Charter rights 
(where that action takes place within the sphere of EU law), the Convention rights (given domestic 
effect by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA)) or common law rights; action by the devolved 
institutions might engage Charter rights and/or Convention rights directly by their incorporation into 
the devolution statutes,2 as well as the Convention rights by virtue too of the HRA, or common law 
rights.   
Here, I will tentatively sketch what might be at stake for fundamental rights in Scots law 
where one layer of protection is removed (part C) after first outlining the ways in which those rights 
are protected in EU law (part A) and the effect on those protections of the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19, as introduced (part B).  
A. THE EU AND FUNDAMNETAL RIGHTS  
 
There was no explicit reference to fundamental rights in the ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?founding 
treaties. Nevertheless, protection of fundamental rights as a general principle of EU law began to 
emerge in the European Court of Justice ?Ɛ (ECJ) jurisprudence during the 1970s. Initially the ECJ had 
been resistant to arguments from fundamental rights, concerned that the unique quality of the 
European project as set out in Van Gend en Loos3 and in Costa4 would be threatened by the 
invalidation by domestic courts of Community law on the basis of incompatibility with indigenous 
constitutional norms.5 However, the ECJ was alive to a second threat: that domestic courts would be 
reluctant to embrace the supremacy of EU law on the basis that stronger protections existed for 
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1 R (Daly) v SSHD [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] AC 532 at para 30 per Lord Cooke of Thorndon. 
2 Scotland Act 1998 s 29. 
3 Case 26/2 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1964] CMLR 423. 
4 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.  
5 M Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (1997) 263-264. 
fundamental rights at the domestic compared with the supra-national level.6 So, in Stauder,7 the ECJ 
responded to the concerns of the German Constitutional Court with the reassurance that 
Community law would be interpreted so as not to  “jeopardise the fundamental human rights 
enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court."8 This line was 
developed in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft9 in which the ECJ asserted the supremacy of 
Community law even over the rights protected by the constitutional laws of the Member States with 
ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ĨŽƌ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?, ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ  “ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ
ĐŽŵŵŽŶƚŽƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?, and in later cases drawing too upon international treaties to which 
the Member States are signatories, with a special status for the ECHR,10  “forms an integral part of 
ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇůĂǁƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŽĨ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?11  
 
Whereas fundamental rights as general principles of EU law were developed by the ECJ in 
order to defend the supremacy principle, the EU Charter was a consciously-devised instrument 
drafted by a specially-convened body at the behest of the Member States. Across seven chapters 
and 54 articles the Charter purports merely to consolidate the rights found in the : ?Ɛcase law, in 
the ECHR, in the common traditions of the Member States, as well as in other international 
instruments to which the Member States are signatories.12 With regard to the Convention, whilst 
there is significant overlap, several Charter provisions expand upon the corresponding Convention 
right (either by including additional categories, e.g. a right to legal aid as an aspect of a fair trial in 
article 47, or by excluding limitations in the Convention, e.g. those relating to discrimination in 
article 14 ECHR), that only ambiguously overlap with the corresponding Convention right (e.g. the 
right to physical and mental integrity in article 3 that might fall within the scope of article 8 ECHR) or 
for which there is no ECHR analogue (e.g. the freedom of arts and sciences in article 13). Moreover, 
article 52(3) of the Charter is explicit that, whilst the ECHR provides a floor for the protection of 
human rights, EU law may provide more expansive protection.  
 
The EU ŚĂƌƚĞƌ ǁĂƐ ĨŝƌƐƚ  “ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ? ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ŽƵŶĐŝů Ăƚ EŝĐĞ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ
referenced by the ECJ in 2006 before being afforded equal status with the EU treaties in article 6 of 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. It therefore now has full legal force: it is unlawful for EU institutions 
legislate or otherwise to act incompatibly with Charter rights, as it is for Member States so to 
legislate or otherwise to act when implementing EU law. So, in ZZ the ECJ applied article 47 of the 
Charter to deportation hearings, extending its scope beyond that of article 6 ECHR, and in so doing 
reminded the UK that national security does not justify ignoring the procedural protections afforded 
by the Charter.13 Domestic courts have also been willing to disapply Acts of Parliament that they 
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deem to be incompatible with Charter rights, including the State Immunity Act 1978,14 the Data 
Protection Act 199815 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2014.16    
 
B. THE EU (WITHDRAWAL) BILL AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
One of the few substantive exceptions to the continuity of EU law rights and obligations in the 
Withdrawal Bill is the exclusion of the Charter from the category of retained EU law.17 The h< ?s 
objections to the Charter are long standing, having secured (with Poland) a protocol to the Lisbon 
Treaty which sought both to preclude the Charter from extending the ability of EU and domestic 
courts to invalidate domestic legislation on the basis of its incompatibility with the Charter (article 
1(1)) and to deny the justiciability of the ŚĂƌƚĞƌ ?Ɛ economic and social rights absent further enabling 
domestic legislation (article 1(2)). Whilst this has been described by ministers ĂƐĂŶ “ŽƉƚ-ŽƵƚ ?ĨƌŽŵ
the Charter,18 the ECJ has stripped the protocol of practical significance, holding that the duty placed 
on domestic courts to review national laws in accordance with standards of EU law flows from the 
general principles of EU law and is merely restated by the Charter.19             
In omitting the Charter from the category of retained EU law it is notable that the UK 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂƐ ƚƵƌŶĞĚŽŶ ŝƚƐŚĞĂĚƚŚĞ: ?Ɛ ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ŝŐŶŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ  “ŽƉƚ-ŽƵƚ ? PĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐ ŝƚƐ
exclusion on the basis that the Charter did not establish new rights but instead codified already 
existing rights and principles of EU law.20 The Bill makes explicit that such rights as exist 
independently of the Charter are to be retained.21 This point is reinforced by an interpretative duty 
placed on domestic courts,  “ƐŽ ĨĂƌ ĂƐ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?, to interpret references to the Charter in EU or 
domestic case law as if they make reference to any corresponding fundamental right or principle.22 
However, the continuity afforded here is limited in at least three senses. First, whilst the general 
principles are a source of Charter rights the latter have in certain areas outpaced the former in 
relation to their content  W the right to education, for example, has been extended by the text of 
article 23 of the Charter to include vocational and continuing training - and in relation to their 
remedial bite. So, in Google v Vidal Hall it was argued that the Charter right gave rise to a firmer 
requirement of financial compensation for a breach of privacy not amounting to pecuniary harm 
than would have been required by recourse to the general principles. Second, the content of the 
retained general principles is limited to those principles that have been recognised as such by the 
ECJ in cases decided before exit day,23 making their continued effect in domestic law contingent 
upon two arbitrary factors: the case load that has come before the Court and the timing of that 
litigation. Third, there will no longer be a right of action in domestic law based on a failure to comply 
with the general principles of EU law.24 Accordingly, whilst EU law rights may be used by domestic 
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19 Case 465/04 Honyvem Informazioni Commerciali Srl v Mariella De Zotti [2006] ECR I-2879 at para 24. 
20 Explanatory notes paras 99-100. 
21 Withdrawal Bill clause 5(5). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Withdrawal Bill schedule 1 para 2. 
24 Withdrawal Bill schedule 1 para 3. 
courts as an aid to the interpretation of retained EU law it will not be possible to disapply post-exit 
legislation on the basis of its incompatibility with EU law rights.25      
C. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IN SCOTS LAW AFTER BREXIT 
What, then, is at stake for the protection of fundamental rights in Scots law in light of Brexit? On one 
reading the answer might be: not much at all. First, because (as outlined above) the underlying rights 
and principles codified by the Charter will form a part of retained EU law. Second, because the locus 
of Charter rights  W applicable to action taken in the sphere of EU law  W will necessarily (if not 
immediately or wholly) dissipate as a result of withdrawal. Third, because there is a significant 
overlap between the Charter and Convention and common law rights, particularly with regard to so-
ĐĂůůĞĚ “ĨŝƌƐƚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĐŝǀŝůĂnd political rights. Fourth, because fundamental rights cases constitute 
a tiny (though marginally increasing) proportion of those cases in which Scottish courts have been 
asked to apply EU law since 1973.26 However, there is reason to believe that the loss of the Charter 
will be more keenly felt than such a reading might admit.  
There is undoubtedly a significant overlap between Convention and Charter rights. In 
Christian Institute v Lord Advocate27 the Supreme Court considered in detail the (ultimately 
succĞƐƐĨƵů ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐEĂŵĞĚWĞƌƐŽŶƐĐŚĞŵĞǁĂƐŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞǁŝƚŚ
article 8 ECHR on the basis that there were insufficient safeguards to protect against the unlawful 
ƐŚĂƌŝŶŐŽĨĂĐŚŝůĚŽƵƌǇŽƵŶŐƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĚĂƚĂ, but said only of the parallel arguments made 
under article 7 (respect for private and family life) and article 8 (protection of personal data) of the 
ŚĂƌƚĞƌƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚhůĂǁďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚǁĞŚĂǀĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶ
relation ƚŽĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ,Z ? ?28 However, in those areas where the Charter extends beyond the 
Convention (such as ƚŽ  “ƚŚŝƌĚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƌŝŐŚƚƐ) or where the protections offered by the Charter 
are more extensive than the corresponding Convention rights (such as we have seen with the 
extension of fair trial rights to cover deportation hearings, or the inclusion therein of a right to legal 
aid) there will undoubtedly be a narrowing of the opportunities to challenge the exercise of 
executive and legislative power.            
In addition, there are important differences between the Charter and the Convention in 
terms of its remedial force and depth of reach into domestic law vis-à-vis incompatible primary 
legislation. In relation to primary legislation made by the UK Parliament, the higher courts may issue 
a decůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďŝůŝƚǇ ǁŚĞƌĞ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ  “ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?29 to read legislation compatibly with a 
Convention right.30 But where an Act of the UK Parliament is incompatible with Charter rights any 
court or tribunal may disapply the offending domestic law, thus offering a more direct and tangible 
remedy to the affected litigant. The loss of the greater remedial force and depth of the Charter with 
regard to post-exit legislation is less significant in relation to the devolved legislatures, which are 
                                                          
25 On the future of disapplication after Brexit ƐĞĞzŽƵŶŐ ? “ĞŶŬŚĂƌďŽƵĐŚĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞŽĨŝƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
(October 24 2017) UK Const L Blog, available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/10/24/alison-young-
benkharbouche-and-the-future-of-disapplication/.  
26 ZŽĚŐĞƌ ? “dŚĞƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨh>ĂǁďǇƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚŽƵƌƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:ƵƌZĞǀ ? ? ? 
27 The Christian Institute and Ors v Lord Advocate [2016] UKSC 51, 2017 SC (UKSC) 29. 
28 Ibid para 104.  
29 Human Rights Act 1998 s 3. 
30 See, for example, Smith v Scott [2007] CSIH 9, 2007 SC 345 in ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞh< ?ƐďůĂŶŬĞƚďĂŶŽŶƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ
voting. 
more tightly constrained by the Convention than is the UK Parliament, albeit here too the range and 
the depth of the protected rights will be less. 
We can address two further claims more quickly albeit their significance should not be 
underplayed. First, the claim made by the UK government that the Charter rights will no longer be 
relevant after exit day is weakened by the model of withdrawal that the UK government has 
adopted. Given the absence of specific human rights safeguards on the face of the Withdrawal Bill 
there is some force in the argument that Charter rights should continue to have bite in relation to 
the field of retained EU law generally and to its unpicking using the extraordinarily broad Henry VIII 
powers conferred upon ministers by the Bill.  Second, though EU law rights might be a negligible 
feature ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ? ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ h ůĂǁ, we should note both the increased (and 
successful) use of Charter rights in England and Wales which we might expect to have a knock on 
effect in this jurisdiction as well as the steps that governments might take during the legislative 
stage of rights review31 in order to pre-empt later legislative and judicial challenges32 before rushing 
to downplay their impact (actual and potential) in Scots law. 
A final point is more speculative: that whilst the Withdrawal Bill precludes any right of action 
arising from the incompatibility of retained EU law with general principles, a separate right of action 
might be available arising out of the devolution statutes where those principles form part of the 
hard legal boundary (with retained EU law replacing the existing EU law boundary) around devolved 
competence. 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
The impact of Brexit on fundamental rights protection in the UK will depend upon the skill with 
which this particular piece is removed from a complex puzzle. The overall structure might remain 
more or less intact, supported by the twin pillars of an evolving Convention and common law rights 
jurisprudence.33 Or, the effect of Brexit might be to bring that structure crashing down  W 
emboldening the government to pursue its policy of HRA repeal and possibly withdrawal from the 
Convention and to limit the interpretative scope of common law rights. We might be left with a 
significantly weakened rights regime that leaves exposed those who depend upon the broader scope 
or remedial depth of Charter rights. Alternatively, release from the tension in EU law between the 
protection of fundamental rights and the operation of the internal market34 might liberate UK and 
devolved institutions differently to determine how and which rights are to be protected and where 
the appropriate balance lies between fundamental rights protection and the public interest. What is 
certain is that many legislative and judicial battles remain to be fought before the status of EU law 
rights in the post-Brexit constitution is settled.     
 
                                                          
31 HRA s 19; Scotland Act ss 31 and 33. 
32 See WŽǁůĞǇĂŶĚDZƵƐƐĞůů ? “dŚĞWŽůŝĐǇWŽǁĞƌŽĨƚŚĞtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ PdŚĞ “WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ^ƚĂƚĞ ?
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ŝůůƐŝŶƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ? ? ?017) 21(3) Edin LR 319. 
33 See the discussion on the primary role of domestic law (here vis-à-vis the Convention) in the protection of 
rights in Osborne v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61, [2014] AC 1115 at paras 54-63 per Lord Reed.     
34 ^ĞĞE:ĚĞŽĞƌ ? “&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůZŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞh/ŶƚĞƌŶĂůDĂƌŬĞƚ P:ƵƐƚŚŽǁ&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůĂƌĞƚŚĞhdƌĞĂƚǇ
&ƌĞĞĚŽŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Utrecht Law Review 148.   
